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CHINA'S PAPER INDUSTRY: GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
DURING ECONOMIC REFORM 
Jintao Xu' 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
China began its program of economic reforms in 1978 and has enjoyed 
double-digit annual growth ever since. Agricultural reforms were implemented most 
aggressively (Lin 1992). Industrial reforms and industrial growth followed and, as in 
any rapidly industrializing economy, so did industrial pollution. Indeed, many see the 
environment as a casualty of two decades of booming growth (e.g., Wong 1998) and 
the environment has become central to national policy. Premier Zhu Rongji, in the 
Government Report to the National People's Congress on March 5, 1999, identified 
sustainable development as one of China's two fundamental strategies for the 21st 
century. President Jiang Zemin, stressed the importance of environmental protection 
at the annual workshop on Population, Resource and Environment on March 13, 
1999. He announced the aggressive new policy that any enterprise not in 
environmental compliance by year 2000 would be closed. 
The central government's position on the competing challenges of 
environment and development is pragmatic. It aggressively seeks growth but it also 
desires environmental protection. Its application of a system of pollution levies is the 
largest application of a market-based regulatory instrument in the developing world. 
Two questions have been central to all considerations of environmental policy: how 
severe is the pollution policy constraint on economic growth, and can economic 
instruments decrease pollution? The government has been willing to try various 
instruments for pollution control, and it has been willing to modify policy when the 
instrument of initial choice proves unsatisfactory. In the paper industry, for example, 
the government has used both standards and charges, closing small mills and taxing 
the effluents of larger mills. The relative merit of the two instruments is a topic of 
continued debate, although government confidence in the effectiveness of economic 
instruments to control pollution seems to be declining. 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the pollution control policies applied 
for the paper industry. The paper industry is the source of 10 percent of China's 
industrial wastewater emissions and one-fourth of its chemical oxygen demand. It is 
the largest source of rural environmental pollution (Huang and Bai 1992). 
We cannot examine pollution policy without also examining the industry's 
pattern of growth because the rapidly changing structure of the paper industry has its 
own effect on pollution. In general, the industry shares many experiences with the full 
I would like to thank David Newman, Runsheng Yin and Knox Lovell for their comments at the 
Productivity Workshop in Athens, Georgia, in November 1998; Zhong Ma, Shigiu Zhang. Benoit 
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manufacturing2 sector, e.g., increasing financial autonomy for individual mills yet 
great variation in local government influence, continued government control of certain 
inputs yet increasing market allocation of final products, the emergence and growth of 
smaller and more autonomous mills, and, of course, double digit annual growth since 
1978. The paper industry is a representative industry in these respects. However, 
each industry is characterized by its own patterns of input use and its own 
relationship between output growth and the production of environmental effluents. 
For the paper industry, some evidence suggests that growth in mill capacity is 
associated with a decline in effluent discharge, yet the expanding number of small 
paper mills is associated with an increase in pollution. Therefore, inducing some 
characteristics of growth in this industry may even be a desirable environmental 
policy, but the targets of such a policy would have to be identified clearly. 
Most of the literature on China's industrial growth tend to be general to the full 
sector. Li (1997), Jefferson et al. (1996, 1992), and Jefferson and Xu (1994) 
examined improvements in aggregate performance since the reforms began. Wang 
et al. (1996) examined mill responsiveness to pollution charges regardless of industry 
specialization. In general, this literature reports increasing efficiency in factor use over 
time (Li 1997), convergence of the marginal revenue products of factors (Jefferson 
and Xu 1994), and the expected emission-reducing performance of pollution charges 
(Wang et al.). Nevertheless, the evidence remains sparse-and confirmation would 
be desirable. Jefferson (1990), for example, points out the paucity of analysis on the 
performance of key industries. The lack of firm-level and industry-level panel data is 
one reason. The absence of good pollution data and the locally selective 
administration of national pollution policy compound the problem. 
We addressed the data problem by collecting pollution information in our own 
survey of 34 paper mills and combining this with mill-level production data from the 
Council of Light Industries (CLI). The result is panel data for mills of various sizes and 
production categories from two representative provinces, Fujian and Yunnan, for the 
period 1982-1994. The mills are all state-owned or managed by collectives. These 
mill categories have been the main targets of the central government's industrial 
reforms and also its pollution control policies.3 The period of our analysis incorporates 
most of the period of gradual industrial reform prior to the government's very recent 
decisions to increase the levy and to allow unprofitable mills to close and profitable 
mills to release surplus labor. 
We used a three-stage procedure to estimate the effects of pollution levies on 
the emissions of environmental pollutants and on production efficiency. The first 
stage provided estimates of the endogenous factors of production, including those 
environmental factors targeted by the pollution levy. The second stage applied 
predicted values from the first stage, together with actual values for the exogenous 
factors, to estimate the production of conventional paper products. We estimated 
frontier production functions (Cornwell et al. 1990, Kumbhakar 1990) in order to 
2 The full manufacturing sector would include such industries as textile, iron and steel, pulp and paper, 
automobile, etc. 
' In the course of 20 years of industrial reform many small private mills (known as township and village 
enterprises or TVEs) have begun production. They became a primary concern of pollution policy in the 1990s 
but most of them did not exist in 1978. 
2 Jintao Xu 
EEPSEA Research Report Series 
obtain firm- and time-specific measures of technical efficiency. The third stage 
assessed the relationships between the mill-level efficiency scores taken from the 
second stage and other influential factors-with special attention to the affect of 
China's pollution levy on efficiency. 
The first stage results showed that the system of pollution levies works. 
Pollution levies decreased the production of environmental effluents-and increasing 
the levies reinforced their favorable effect. We found no consistent evidence that the 
pollution levies decreased economic efficiency for most classes of mills, which is 
more or less consistent with the US experiences (Jafe 'et al. 1995) and should 
partially relieve the government's concerns when imposing environmental regulations 
to its rapidly growing industry. Yet we observed a substantial opportunity to increase 
efficiency through improved labor productivity. This observation is consistent with the 
government's recent decision to relax its policy of employment protection for workers 
in the larger state-owned mills. In addition, increasing returns to productive scale is 
plausible, and it would be consistent with a second recent government decision to 
close the most offending small mills. 
2.0 BACKGROUND: MARKET REFORM AND CHINA'S PAPER INDUSTRY 
Unlike China's agricultural and forestry reforms, which began with widespread 
introduction of the household responsibility system in 1978 and resulted in rapid 
modification of the system of agricultural collectives (Lin 1992, Yin and Hyde 1999), 
China's industrial reforms began later, in 1984, and proceeded more gradually. The 
results, however, are no less impressive. Three broad classes of reforms characterize 
the changes in industrial policy: 
gradual improvements in firm-level autonomy in the selection of inputs and 
input mixes (a "manager responsibility system"), 
reform in product distribution (a "dual track" of both centrally allocated and 
market allocated production with firms permitted to distribute an increasing 
share of final output directly to the market), and 
urban reform-which permitted a private manufacturing sector to emerge. 
By 1991, the central government had began talking of a market economy and 
allowing the reform of many state-owned firms, including the sale of some state- 
owned firms and infusion of foreign investment in others. Nevertheless, the 
government continues to be the major actor in the economy, and many unprofitable 
state-owned firms remain in operation today. 
China's industrial reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s were accompanied by 
financial reforms beginning in the mid-1980s. The financial reforms increased local 
financial autonomy and reduced the central government's budgetary support for most 
firms. Even today, however, firms may apply to the central government for budgetary 
assistance for their largest investment projects. 
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The overall impact of combined industrial and financial reforms has been 
growth in the manufacturing sector at an average annual rate of 15 percent since 
1978. The early years, until 1985, were characterized by output growth from more 
efficient use of inputs. Since 1985, more of the sector's growth has been due to the 
expanding consumption of inputs (Li 1997). 
The government began addressing the problem of unprofitable mills in 1993 
as a new move to maintain its commitment to growth. It now endorses external 
investment in some and allows others to go out of business. It also allows managers 
to release redundant labor. 
Our production functions demonstrated just how critical the latter policy 
revision is for the paper industry. State-owned firms typically offer the best benefits- 
although not necessarily the best wages-and attract many of the best workers. 
Furthermore, until 1993, these firms had an obligation to hire local labor, as 
employment was a birthright for children of current employees. This obligation 
generated excess employment and redundant labor has been a serious drag on 
efficiency performance. 
China's history of reforms made no specific distinctions for the paper industry, 
hence the later has followed general industrial and finance sector reforms. Another 
component of China's reforms, trade policy, had a notable effect on the paper 
industry. The opening of international markets permitted rapid expansion in timber 
and pulp imports in the early 1980s, and a three-fold increase in raw wood imports 
over the full decade. This created a coastal concentration of mills that are reliant on 
wood fiber. It also explains China's rapid specialization in printing and writing, 
packaging, and production of sanitary papers. Newsprint production has grown at a 
slower 6 percent annual rate because international competitors have a competitive 
advantage in the long fibers required for this technology (Almanac of China's Paper 
Industry 1993). 
Following these industrial, financial, and trade reforms, China's modern paper 
industry features the Kraft pulping technology, producing both bleached and 
unbleached papers. This technology and two alternative raw materials (wood and 
non-wood fibers) are important to understanding pollution from the industry. The 
bleached process, used predominantly in the production of printing and writing paper, 
requires more additional chemicals and produces greater concentrations of 
undesirable effluents. The unbleached process, used predominantly for packaging 
material, is less environmentally intrusive. 
Paper produced from wood fiber is associated with larger capacity mills- 
which require larger inventories of raw materials and larger storage facilities. This 
can mean more water for storage impoundments and more effluents. The pollution 
control technologies for these operations are well developed. China's industry, 
however, is dependent on non-wood fibers (largely agricultural residues) at a 3:1 ratio 
over wood fiber. Rapid agricultural growth since 1978 provided fiber for eight-fold 
growth in the production of smaller paper mills between 1984 and 1992 (Almanac of 
China's Paper Industry 1993). These smaller mills have been rapid innovators, but 
they remain dependent on pollution control technologies that are not as effective for 
non-wood fibers. Non-wood fibers deteriorate more rapidly in storage, leaving a larger 
.Ji ilao XI-,t 
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volume of untreated residues in the holding ponds and wastewater effluents of 
smaller mills. Smaller paper mills have been identified as the largest source of 
pollution in China's rural environment (State Council 1997). 
A comparison of mill capacity in China with the capacity in North America and 
Europe provides further perspective on the pollution management problem. Standard 
paper mills in North American and Europe have an annual capacity ranging from 
several hundred thousand to two million tonnes. In contrast, the capacity of the 
largest mill in China is only 250,000 tonnes and any mill over 30,000 tonnes is 
considered large. The large number of mills offsets their small average capacity. 
China has more than 1,000 state-owned and collective mills, and nine times as many 
other (private or township and village enterprise) operations, almost all with capacities 
under 10,000 tonnes. In contrast, Canada has only 115 paper mills but its total 
capacity is 25 percent greater than that of China (Almanac of China's Paper Industry 
1993). 
The large number of Chinese mills means that pollution monitoring and 
enforcement are more complex than in North America or Europe. The smaller size of 
China's mills suggests that entry and exit from the industry has been rapid-which 
also contrasts with the experience of large-capacity, high-fixed-cost North American 
and European operations. 
This brings us to a final fundamental issue-China's pollution control policy. 
In 1982, the central government imposed a system of levies on air pollutants, on total 
wastewater, and on the concentrations of three pollutants contained in wastewater: 
total suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, and other solids. The first two are 
characteristic of the paper industry. The levy rates were reassessed in 1989 and 
increased in 1992. 
The instrument for administering pollution policy is simple. Their administration 
has been more complex, and that is one reason for the continuing debate about the 
instrument's effectiveness. Local environmental agencies collect the tax and they 
have the authority to negotiate the revenue actually collected from each mill. Since 
each county in each of the 32 provinces, autonomous regions, and large 
municipalities has its own environmental agency, what began as a simple uniform 
system for taxing environmental emissions became a vast array of negotiated 
settlements. The environmental minister himself criticized the system for its variation 
in local applications and because the actual tax may often be too low to be effective 
(Qu 1991). 
Finally, the central government added a new environmental policy instrument 
in 1996. It simply closed 4,000 small firms in 15 industries; 1,000 of these were 
paper mills. The government's current rule is to close all paper mills with annual 
capacity under 5,000 tonnes. Its has no other effective means to control effluents 
from these heaviest polluters. 
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EEPSEA Research Report Series 
3.0 THEORY AND ANALYTICAL ORGANIZATION 
Our objective was to measure how environmental regulations enacted during 
China's economic reforms have affected mill-level efficiency in the mills, as well as 
the level of environmental waste. The method used was similar to recent econometric 
work with panel data by Cornwell et al. (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990). It was based 
on an analysis of covariance that assumes that the intercepts and some coefficients 
of the production function vary between firms and over time. Intertemporal changes 
in efficiency were critical because China's reforms were implemented gradually and 
adjustments in mill efficiency have surely accompanied the industry's rapid growth 
during the period of reform. Fortunately, the error term generated by this approach 
does not require stringent distributional assumptions (Kumbhakar 1990).4 
We followed a three-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, prior to 
estimating the production function, we obtained predicted values (instruments) for the 
endogenous inputs in the production process-.5 
X =.f(X" It,T,1, (1) 
where X;t is a vector of endogenously determined inputs used by firm i at time 
t, X-;t is a vector of exogenous inputs, z;t represents pollution taxes 
imposed on firm i at time t, [2e is a vector of other factors affecting input 
choices, and Slit is a stochastic error term. In addition to providing 
instruments for the second stage of our analysis, equation (1) will be 
important for assessing how input choices and environmental wastes 
have responded to environmental reforms and, specifically, to China's 
system of pollution levies. 
Labor and durable capital were exogenous variables in our production 
function. In the period of our analysis and for state-owned firms, the government, not 
the firms' managers, made the decisions about these inputs as part of its overall labor 
and financial-budgetary policies. The endogenous inputs to paper production 
included energy, chemicals, and environmental waste. The inclusion of emissions as 
negative inputs to production is standard within the environmental regulation literature 
whenever abatement inputs are unobserved (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1988). Higher 
levels of emission are consistent with lower levels of abatement inputs. Since 
4 The large paper mills in Europe and North America normally operate in excess of 96 percent of their capacity. 
This is characteristic of high fixed cost operations and plant size is the key explanatory variable for productive 
output. These characteristics mean that a linear input-output approach typically describes the most reliable 
models of their production (e.g.. Buongiomo and Gillis 1987, Yin 1998)_ The smaller scale and greater 
variability in scale in China's paper mills is more conducive to econometric specification. 
Our approach also contrasts with many other assessments of the instruments of pollution policy because 
we have the input data to model the full production process. Some of the best economic literature on pollution 
control has been restricted to regressions of effluent levels on pollution policy and other decision variables 
because input data were unavailable (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1986). 
This is similar to a 2SLS approach where predicted values of endogenous variables are obtained prior to 
estimating the production function. Kumbhakar (1990) discusses the problems of endogenous inputs and their 
consequences for estimations of the production frontier. 
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substitution between abatement and non-abatement inputs affects output, measures 
of emissions serve as instruments for the endogenous abatement decisions of the 
firm.6 
An extensive literature considers the endogeneity of pollution levies (Pargal 
and Wheeler 1996; Laplante and Rilstone 1996; Deily and Gray 1991, 1996; Dion et 
al. 1998). It observes that enforcement is sensitive to differences in regional 
economic development, public awareness, and environmental quality, but less 
sensitive to plant characteristics. These findings are reasonable because efficient 
pollution fees are related to regional preferences and assimilative capacity. This 
means they would be endogenous to the enforcement agency. They are exogenous, 
however, from the perspective of the firm and that is why the literature on 
endogeneity observes that fees are less sensitive to plant characteristics. Following 
this reasoning, we treated the pollution levy as exogenous for our firms. 
In the second stage, we applied predicted inputs from the first stage to 
estimate a time series, cross-section production function of the form, 
Oi, = 17(Xi,,X--i,,YV;t>N,g21 (2) 
where Q;t measures output, Xi1 is a vector of predicted endogenous inputs, W, 
is a vector of predicted environmental wastes, and Q is a vector of 
parameters to estimate. Equation (2) separates environmental wastes 
from other endogenous inputs estimated in Equation (1) only for 
emphasis and clarity in subsequent discussion. 
In the third stage, we examined technical efficiency scores for different 
classes of firms. Efficiency scores can be predicted from the results of equations (1) 
and (2), and hypothesis tests can be performed on the efficiency scores to determine 
how they differ by classes of firms, how efficiency changes over time (and therefore, 
with the progress of China's reform policies), and how effective the pollution levy has 
been in encouraging improvements in efficiency. This last question is the subject of 
debate within China today, and also within the general literature of environmental 
regulation-especially in conceptual work that compares pollution control innovations 
induced by price or quantity instruments (Oates et al. 1993). 
We can estimate a time- and firm-specific efficiency term by introducing a 
"fixed effect" into the production function: 
L)i, =air+T(Xir,X-,1, 1ifl,s2;r), (3) 
where a,t is an unobservable efficiency scale (i.e., the fixed effect) that varies 
over time and across firms. Firms that are relatively inefficient and "further" from the 
frontier have efficiency scales that are lower in magnitude than firms that are 
relatively more efficient and "closer" to the frontier. The conventional specification of 
ait is 
° The alternative would be to estimate. first, the joint production of both a market output and the environmental 
waste using both abatement and non-abatement inputs and then to develop predictive equations for both 
emissions and inputs. This approach requires abatement input data - which were not available. 
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Yoil+Y,i,t+Y2 (4) 
where t is time (e.g., Cornwell et al. 1990, Kumbhakar 1990). In sum, technical 
efficiency depends on the class of firm and it follows a certain path of 
change over time. 
The parameter alt is embedded in the error term in equation (3) and cannot be 
observed directly. We can obtain a consistent estimate for it following a three-step 
procedure recommended by Cornwell et al. (1990). The first step is to develop 
estimates for the two RHS terms in equation (3). An estimate for F can be obtained 
by regressing Q on the appropriate functional specification for F. The residual of this 
regression (i.e., 0, - fZil ), regressed on the RHS of equation (4), provides an 
estimate for y's. That is, 
\i - PZ, -Y"il + 7i + Y,t 2 +71, (5) 
where Zip is a new vector that summarizes all explanatory variables in f and 17 
is a white noise error term. The final step applies the fitted values from 
the RHS of eq. (5) to recover an estimate of firm- and time-specific 
efficiency, 
a,, =Y, It +Y1l!' +YilrI 
where the y 's are estimated parameters from equation (5). 
(6) 
Since a firm that produces on the frontier of efficient production would have 
the highest predicted efficiency score, 
l`tma - maX(a,). 
then a measure of the distance between any other firm and the firm on the 
production frontier is a measure of the relative inefficiency of the firm that is 
not on the frontier. In other words, 
fill = /111111X - i, (7) 
is the difference between the first firm's predicted efficiency parameter and 
the maximum efficiency score, 
Finally, by regressing this inefficiency score f'i, on pollution control policies 
and other important determinants of efficiency, we can examine how the efficiencies 
of different classes of firms change in response to these factors. 
8 Jintoo Xz-i 
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4.0 DATA 
4.1 Production Data 
The sources of our production data were the annual paper industry statistics 
and annual information briefs compiled by the Council of Light Industries (CLI, 
formerly the Ministry of Light Industries). These statistics and briefs report production 
and financial information for about 1100 mills in 32 provinces, autonomous districts, 
and large municipalities-essentially all the mills under the jurisdiction of the central 
government. These mills accounted for approximately 90 percent of China's 
papermaking capacity in the early 1980s. They comprise about 50 percent of the 
national capacity today. 
The CLI data include sales income, output value (evaluated in both current 
and 1980 prices), profits and tax payments, physical outputs by product and grade, 
pulp production by grade, material inputs (including fiber, chemicals, and energy), 
employment (number of employees, number of engineers) and wages, and five 
measures of capital stock or annual investments in durable capital. 
Output weighted by 1980 prices was our summary measure of all production. 
Otherwise, we concentrated on physical measures because the personnel at CLI 
expect the physical data to be more reliable than price or cost data. The measure of 
capital was problematic because, for much of our 1982-1992 period of analysis, the 
government has not required state-owned firms to pay many capital costs. Our choice 
for a measure of capital was net capital stock. In China's accounting terminology, this 
was capital stock net of depreciation but unadjusted for inflation.' 
4.2 Pollution Data 
The sources of our pollution data were the firm-level accounts collected by 
local environmental agencies. These data are dispersed in offices around the 
country. We arranged a firm-level survey of the three important classes of papermill 
emissions (wastewater measured in cubic meters, total suspended solids in tonnes, 
and chemical oxygen demand in tonnes) from county offices in two southern 
provinces, Fujian and Yunnan. These provinces were selected partially because of 
the willingness of their environmental officials to assist us. The county agencies 
confirmed the reliability of these data with periodic random checks at each mill." We 
reconfirmed any doubtful pollution data with mill managers themselves and with 
records kept at the mills. 
Fujian is an industrial and coastal province. Among China's 32 provinces, it 
ranks in the mid-upper level in paper production. It also represents the advanced 
portion of China's paper industry that has been subject to a broader and longer 
Jefferson. Ra%vski and Zheng (1996) reviewed this problem. They too prefer to use net capital stock for 
production analysis but they add a tens, the ratio of net capital to original capital. to adjust for inflation. We 
remain uncertain as to what is the best retormulation. Therefore, we replaced our measure of capital with a 
measure of' investment and re-ran our basic production rearession. There are no fu ndaumental differences 
betvycen the two equations, and both measures of capital perform as expected. 
h 
The willingness ofthe environmental officials in Fujian and Yulnlan to assist us may be an indication of their 
confidence in their data. Officials in other provinces with poorer data were less willing to provide assistance. 
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exposure to government intervention because of its importance to the national 
supply. China's largest newsprint and its largest sack and Kraft mills are all in Fujian. 
These and other wood fiber processing mills account for about 40 percent of 
provincial production. This means that majority of the mills in Fujian still use non- 
wood fibers-and that mills in Fujian, on the whole, provide a complete image of 
China's paper industry. 
Yunnan is an inland province with no large paper mills but a couple of 
medium-sized operations. It is an average province in terms of its important resource 
inputs. Wood fiber-based production accounts for about 20 percent of the provincial 
total, a share that approaches the national average. Most mills in Yunnan, and the 
rest of the country, utilize agricultural residues and other locally available non-wood 
fiber resources. 
We began with a complete survey of all the mills originally under CLI 
supervision. These included approximately 50 mills in Fujian and 40 mills in Yunnan. 
Some mills that were active in 1982 when the pollution levy was first implemented 
had become inactive by the time data were collected; some active mills provided only 
incomplete pollution data. We surveyed 17 mills in each province (generally no more 
than one per county) for which we could match annual pollution data with annual 
production data from CLI. A Chow test justified combining our production and 
pollution data from the two provinces.9 
The CLI production data were complete between 1982 and 1992. The Fujian 
pollution data covered seven of 11 years in this period. However, the Yunnan 
pollution data, were complete only after 1986, hence, we applied a procedure 
recommended by Griliches (1986) to estimate the missing pollution data from 1982- 
1985. In this procedure, the 1986-1992 data were used to regress emission levels on 
productive inputs for those years. The estimated input coefficients from this first 
stage, plus the actual input data for 1982 and 1985, were combined to predict the 
missing observations on emission levels. 
4.3 The Pollution Levy 
The official water pollution regulation stipulates a graduated fee on total 
wastewater effluents plus a flat fee per concentration unit of total suspended solids, 
chemical oxygen demand, or other solids10. The fee is charged if a pollutant exceeds 
a set minimum standard. If a factory discharges several pollutants, the levy is 
charged on the worst case-defined as wastewater plus the pollutant on which the 
estimated total levy is highest among all effluents. Local environmental agencies 
have the authority to charge a higher rate. Some do but, in fact, many charge at 
lower rates. In addition, local agencies also have the authority to return up to 80 
percent of the total levy to assist the firms in purchasing pollution control equipment. 
.fhe Clx>w-test compared the 01.S version of frontier functions for the two provinces with data from 1986- 
1992. the pears in Nvhich our data are complete. Comparing the Chow F(7. 150)=0.3185 with the critical value 
of 2.01 from the F table at the 95%% confidence level. we cannot reject the hypothesis that the last seven slopes 
for regular production inputs and mill characteristics are equal fhr two separate estimations. 
10 The levels of emissions are self-reported by the polluting firms and the monitoring team within the local 
environmental agency conducts random checks for the accuracy of the reporting. Misreporting of emission 
level may result in penalties to the firm in the tbnns of fine and/or increased levy rate. 
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The result is great variation across firms and counties in the effective rates of 
pollution charges. Variable rates may be inequitable, but they are an advantage for 
our analysis because these allowed us to examine how effluent levels, production of 
conventional outputs, and efficiency all change with respect to different levels of the 
levy rate. 
Perhaps the best measure of the effective levy rate for any firm would be a 
ratio of the firm's net levies (after any reimbursement from the county's environmental 
agency) to the basic liability assessed according to the central government's pollution 
levy regulations. An increase in this ratio would be the equivalent of an increase in 
the levy on pollution. We calculated the denominator of this ratio from the central 
government's pollution levy tables and our firm-level pollution data. For the 
numerator we could only obtain measures of gross payments (after the county 
agency adjusted the central government's rates but before it returned any share of 
the levy to the firm). The result was an imperfect measure of the final effective levy 
rate for each firm, but we found out later that even this measure demonstrates that 
pollution levies are a disincentive to pollute and that higher levy rates (a larger ratio) 
are greater disincentives. 
4.4 Are Fujian and Yunnan Representative? 
Do data from Fujian and Yunnan characterize only those two provinces, or are 
they representative of production and pollution data for China in general? The most 
reliable comparison of these two provinces with all-China would be a comparison of 
the full Fujian-Yunnan production function with the all-China production function. Our 
lack of pollution data for all-China prevents this. Collecting effluent data for the rest of 
China's mills would also be an enormous task, hence, the limited sample. 
Alternatively, we can compare Fujian and Yunnan's mills with mills from other 
provinces in terms of both their labor productivity and the physical productivity of their 
basic raw material inputs. Fujian's labor productivity is above the mean for all 
provinces but within a standard deviation of the mean for each year in our sample. 
Yunnan's labor productivity is below the mean but growing toward it, and it is always 
within a standard deviation of that mean. The average physical productivities of 
Fujian's and Yunnan's mills also fall within a standard deviation of the all-province 
mean for each of four major raw material inputs: unbleached chemical woodpulp, 
unbleached wood, imported pulp, and unbleached straw. (As expected, the average 
physical productivity of Fujian's mills exceeds the average physical productivity of 
Yunnan's mills for all four.)" These evidences are the bases of this study's argument 
that Fujian's and Yunnan's mills are representative of the production and pollution 
data for China in general. 
11 Tables and statistics available from the author 
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5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Environmental Policy, Economic Reform, and the Decision to Pollute 
The first stage of our empirical analysis was to estimate the endogenous 
inputs to production. The results from this stage became inputs for the assessment 
of the production function in the second stage. The first stage results were also the 
source of observations on the effects of environmental policy and economic reform 
on managers' decisions, especially the decision to pollute. Pollution is a component 
of these first two stages because mill managers have some control over the levels of 
effluents discharged from their mills and because we recall the convention to treat 
effluents as negative inputs to production. 
Managerial decisions in state-owned and collective firms have been limited to 
decisions about variable inputs, essentially chemicals (ALK for alkali, the most 
important chemical) and energy (E), water, fiber, and unidentified abatement inputs. 
In our production analysis, the levels of discharge or concentration for wastewater 
(WW), total suspended solids (TSS), and chemical oxygen demand (COD) were 
instruments for decisions about abatement effort. This made five dependent variables 
and five regressions, each of which was a function of the firm's exogenous inputs; 
capital (K), labor (L), and the pollution levy rate (TXR); and other factors that could 
affect managerial decisions. These "other factors" were output prices (P), time (t), 
and the basic production technologies associated with each mill. The time variable 
accounted for the overall effect of China's gradual industrial, financial, and trade 
reforms on pollution. Dummy variables distinguished bleach-using production 
processes (BD), and mills that are wholly reliant on either wood (WD) or non-wood 
(NWD) fibers. Another dummy variable distinguished mills in Fujian (FD) from mills in 
Yunnan. 
The resulting regressions are of the form: 
In X,, = 8 +.5t In K;, + 8, In L,, + b; In IXI?,, + 84 In P,, 
+ 8; t + 8, BD; + 8, WD, + 8, NWD; + 8g N), + E,,, (8) 
where the e s are parameters and the X, are any of five endogenous inputs to 
production. An appendix table contains a complete list of all variables 
and their units of measure. 
Table 1 reports the OLS coefficients for the three effluent regressions. The 
equation fits are satisfactory and most coefficients satisfy expectations. 
Increasing amounts of either capital or labor increase the levels of all three 
effluents. (Four of six coefficients are statistically significant.) We recall that the 
levels of capital and labor are determined by central authority. Mill managers had little 
discretion over them in the period of our analysis. We might anticipate that increases 
in these two inputs are associated with increased production, and that total 
production of the conventional output and total effluents are directly related. (Our 
production function in the second stage supports this logic for capital. The labor 
variable is an important special case.) 
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Table 1. Effluent decisions' 
Variable wastewater TSS COD 
Constant -0.6407 0.5808 -2.8698 
(-0.5132) (0.3353) (-1.5705) 
In (capital) 0.1772 0.0255 0.2983 * 
(1.6152) (0.1678) (1.8582) 
In (labor) 1.0978 *** 1.4763 *** 1.0461 *** 
(7.4293) (7.2055) (4.8393) 
In (tax rate) -0.2731 *** -0.4498 *** -0.6205*** 
(-5.0255) (-5.9668) (-7.8022) 
In (price) -0.1587 -0.6629 *** -0.0835 
(-0.9455) (-2.8467) (-0.3400) 
t 0.0633 0.1983 *** 0.1252 * 
(1.3960) (3.1517) (1.8869) 
Dummies 
bleach 0.2103 -0.4681 ** 0.3201 
(1.2833) (-2.0591) (1.3346) 
wood fiber -0.1295 -0.1659 0.0491 
(-0.6803) (-0.6283) (0.1764) 
non-wood fiber -0.8112 *** 0.1099 -0.2474 
(-3.4672) (0.3387) (-0.7226) 
Fujian 0.5024 *** -0.1072 -0.7344 *** 
(3.3622) (-0.5172) (-3.3575) 
F(9,914) 60.08 32.3 31.65 
' Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. *** 
levels, respectively. 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
The pollution levy is a disincentive to pollute, and increases in the levy rate 
cause statistically significant decreases in the levels of all three pollutants. 
Higher output prices should be an incentive for production. Since we expect 
pollution to increase with production, we also expect higher prices to increase the 
flow of environmental effluents. The contrary (negative) sign may reflect the 
opposite-adoption of better pollution control technologies and increasing recovery 
and re-use of some environmental wastes as prices increase. The statistical 
insignificance of the price terms leaves us uncertain regarding which argument 
dominates. However, statistical insignificance is not surprising if we recall that a 
substantial share of mill production was centrally allocated for most of the period of 
our analysis. Mill managers had discretion over some input decisions but the central 
government only gradually introduced a "dual track" of both centrally allocated and 
market allocated distribution of the final industrial products. 
Time had a positive (and generally significant) relationship to pollution that we 
anticipated if it reflected growth in conventional outputs without corresponding 
improvements in pollution control technologies. 
Bleach pulping processes use more chemicals than other production 
processes. While their COD emissions are greater, the effect is not statistically 
significant. Firms that are entirely reliant on wood fiber might pollute less because the 
pollution control technologies available to them are more advanced. In fact, the 
regressions show that these firms do produce less wastewater and lower levels of 
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TSS, but these effects are also not statistically significant. This indicates that 
probably their adoption of pollution control technologies is not widespread. Firms 
wholly dependent on non-wood fibers should be heavier polluters because their 
pollution control technologies are less advanced. Our evidence does not support this 
expectation either-which further indicates that the wood-using mills have not 
adopted the available technological advantages. The Fujian dummy indicates a 
region in which larger wood-using firms play a larger role in production. The 
significant positive sign on wastewater production in Fujian further shows that there is 
no widespread use of pollution control technologies to this class of firms. In fact, we 
know that large firms practice flushing to address their problems with other effluents, 
a practice that increases wastewater effluents. The signs and significance of the 
Fujian dummy confirm this behavior. 
The policy conclusions that emerge from these observations are entirely 
consistent with economic theory, with China's history of economic reforms, and also 
with the central government's more recent revisions of its pollution control policies 
and administration. China's general economic reforms led to increases in the 
conventional outputs of industrial production. The study shows that the increases in 
production came at an increasing cost in terms of environmental quality. As 
environmental quality deteriorated, the government has directed more attention to it, 
by first establishing a system of pollution levies, and then increasing these levies. The 
levies are a statistically significant disincentive for firms in China's paper industry to 
pollute the environment. The evidence in this study should remove any doubt about 
that question. But apparently the levies are not high enough to be an incentive for 
firms to adopt advanced pollution control technologies12. As the economy has 
continued to grow and as environmental quality has continued to deteriorate, the 
production of environmental pollutants has become an increasingly important issue. 
For sure, paper industry emissions have continued to increase, and both the low 
levels of the pollution levies and their uneven administration have become more 
troublesome. In 1997 (after the 1982-1992 period of our data) the government 
announced a more aggressive regulatory stance-equating "ecological conservation" 
with pollution control and closing the smallest mills (State Council). It also began the 
process of moving away from decentralized administration of the pollution levy toward 
a uniform centralized system. Perhaps it should increase the levy as well. 
5.2 The Production Function 
The second stage of our analysis was an assessment of the frontier 
production function. The estimated first-stage dependent variables were inputs to this 
function. The firm- and time-specific measures of efficiency that emerge from it 
became the data for our third stage assessment of the determinants of efficiency. Our 
observation of a negative marginal contribution for labor was a second interesting 
conclusion. This unusual result, its impact on pollution, and the government's policy 
response was closely examined. 
This concurs with the general criticisms toward the levy system. The envirolmmeutal authority in China 
favors the adoption of the end-of-pipe Itaeility in pollution control, but the investment oaten is too high a 
financial burden to a large number of smailpaper mills. I lence ifthere is ever any effort in pollution reduction, 
it is more often happening in-the-process. namely. liens putting more energy in the ellicient use of materials 
and/or making internal adiustment to reduce waste emissions. This may reduce conventional output due to 
productive inputs being transferred to the abatement process. 
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We used a restricted translog specification of production in which there were 
no cross-effects for pollutants with pollutants. The restricted form eliminated the 
possibility that the pollutants (as negative inputs) might destroy the concave form of 
the function. 
In 0, = ai, + 
J=1 
16, In Z1.i, + 
4 4 I /3Jk In Z,.i, In Z,,,,, 
j -1 k-_,1 J 
0;D1 +82i, (9) 
J- S 
The first four inputs were capital, labor, and the two endogenous conventional 
inputs, energy and chemicals, estimated in the first stage. The next three were the 
negative environmental inputs, wastewater, TSS, and COD, which were also 
estimated as endogenous inputs in the first stage. The three dummy variables 
identified were all-wood, all non-wood, and bleach production processes. air was the 
efficiency scale for the i-th firm. The /3j, /3ik, and Ojwere parameters. 
A second appendix table reports the estimated parameters. The equation 
statistics are satisfactory. All first-order coefficients except that on the energy input 
satisfy expectations (and the energy coefficient is insignificant). The second-order 
and cross effects are highly significant (with only one exception). These latter results 
support our selection of a translog form. The significance of all capital-related 
coefficients is consistent with a high fixed cost, capacity-driven industry. 
Table 2 in the text summarizes the output and substitution elasticities 
calculated from these coefficients. The negative output elasticity for labor is the most 
interesting observation as it indicates that the marginal product of labor is negative. 
The last worker crowds productive earlier workers and actually causes total output to 
be less than it would have been if the last worker had not been hired.13 This unusual 
result is more reasonable than it first seems. Employment has been a birthright for 
children of employees of state-owned firms. Before the recent trend to "privatization", 
collective-owned firms also followed a policy of employment security. After 50 years 
of state ownership, this policy has created excess employment in many firms. The 
problem became so great by the 1980s that mill managers commonly instructed some 
employees to stay home. Yet these unproductive workers continued to be paid. 
These managerial decisions are only consistent with an observation that marginal 
workers contributed negatively to a firm's total product. 
Table 2. Production elasticities 
V i bl Output 
Alllen partial elasticities of substitutions 
ar a e 
elasticity K L E ALK WW TSS 
Capital 0.8432 
Labor -0.5906 0.9275 
Energy 2.7823 0.6937 0.9161 
Alkali -2.2395 0.8375 0.8524 0.9386 
Wastewater 0.2983 0.2848 0.7205 0.8534 0.9159 
TSS 3.4708 0.2848 03205 0.8534 0.9159 0.6628 
COD -5.7197 0.2848 0.7205 0.8534 0.9159 0.6628 0.6628 
13 Various estimates of production with alternative l'unctional forms all yield similar negative and significant 
marginal products of labor. 
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The negative marginal productivity may not be true for all state-owned and 
collective firms, but it is not restricted to paper producers in Fujian and Yunnan, or 
even to the paper industry in general. Excess employment (if not negative marginal 
productivity) has been a national problem. The central government recognized this 
constraint to growth and initiated a major policy change in 1995. Managers now have 
the authority to release excess workers, although they continue to pay a minimum 
monthly stipend to these released workers. Seventeen million workers, or more than 
one of every five from state-owned firms, were expected to be removed from the 
payrolls of state-owned companies between 1995 and the end of 1998 (Wilhelm 
1999; Saywell 1999). 
The other elasticities in Table 2 demonstrate the effect of this unusual labor 
observation. For example, the output elasticities show that the next unit of capital 
would be more productive than the last unit of labor. The positive substitution 
elasticities indicate that all inputs are substitutes with each other.14 They show that it 
takes more labor than capital to substitute for another unit of the conventional energy 
and chemical inputs and still produce the same level of conventional product. This 
means that capital is more productive than labor at the margin-which is what we 
would expect for a process that employs excess labor. The effluent substitution 
elasticities show that (at the margin) it takes three times as much labor as capital to 
reduce effluents by one unit. Effluent production is largely a function of capital 
management, but excess labor also contributes to these results. If mill managers 
could have transferred resources from labor to capital, the marginal product of labor 
would have increased, total paper production would have increased, and pollution 
would have decreased. Therefore, it is anticipated that China's new policy allowing 
managers to release excess workers will yield a double dividend by improving 
efficiency and maintaining growth (the policy objective), and also by improving the 
environment (the unplanned second dividend). 
The alkali output elasticity also has an unexpected negative sign-indicating 
excessive use and a negative marginal product. It may be unimportant because the 
first-order alkali coefficient in the translog equation is so insignificant. Alternatively, it 
may be explained by the managers' decisions to use purchased alkali excessively 
because of its very low relative price and budget effects. Alkali is used to separate 
useful fiber from residual raw material. Its over-use may allow managers to focus on 
what they perceive to be more costly components of the production process.15 
Where pollution control is enforced, mills recover and re-use some alkali and 
the concentration of COD discharges declines. Where enforcement is weak, less 
alkali is recovered and the concentration of COD discharges increases. Therefore, 
the negative output elasticity for COD supports the contentions of over-use of the 
alkali input and the low incentive effect of COD levies on the adoption of pollution 
control technologies by bleach process mills. 
IFhe identical elasticities 0I'suhst1tut1on butvveelI auv input and all threw cFtluonts arc due to the restrictions 
on effluents in our translog production Function (no second order citluent-ef(1ucnt terms). 
This would be similar to the over-use of pesticides and Icrtiliier by mean American farmers (Carlson and 
Wctrstcin 1993). 
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The much larger capacity paper mills in more developed countries should 
raise curiosity regarding potential scale effects in China's mills. Normally, the sum of 
the output elasticities tells us about scale effects.16 Our output elasticities are an 
underestimate for two reasons. First, the dummy variable indicators of fiber inputs 
reflect the positive sign but not the magnitude of the effect of raw material inputs on 
output. Their positive signs indicate that if we had the data to calculate the 
elasticities, they would increase our estimate of returns to scale. Second, we would 
need to remove the labor inefficiency problem to obtain a measure of true 
technological returns to scale. With efficient employment of labor, the labor output 
elasticity would also be positive. Combining both corrections causes us to doubt the 
observed decreasing returns to scale. 
Indeed, this raises the possibility of increasing return to scale (IRS) as a new 
question. IRS would suggest opportunity for continued productivity growth simply by 
increasing mill size. If China's pollution levy affects effluent levels, but not 
conventional output levels-as our first stage results suggest-then China's paper 
industry may be able to grow and control pollution simultaneously. This remains a 
possibility worth further examination. 
Finally, our frontier production function is the source of relative inefficiency 
scores derived according to the procedure of equations (4)-(7). The third and fourth 
appendix tables record these scores for each mill in our sample. We expect 
improvements in efficiency over time (decreasing inefficiency scores), as the industry 
has grown over the decade of our data, and we expect greater efficiency in the larger 
and bleach technology mills, especially in Fujian, because this is the most rapidly 
growing and most technologically advanced segment of our sample. These 
expectations are consistent with the results from the first two stages of our analysis 
and the appendix tables of inefficiency scores confirm them. A firm's fiber source 
(wood or non-wood) does not seem to confer an efficiency advantage. This result is 
also consistent with our first- and second-stage regressions, if not with our initial 
expectations. 
5.3 The Determinants of Productive Efficiency 
The final stage of our analysis examined the determinants of change in 
productive efficiency. Improvements in productive efficiency might come from better 
quality capital or labor, or from improved energy inputs. We were particularly 
interested in whether the pollution levies also had an affect on technical efficiency. 
Table 3 shows the results of our regression analysis where the observations on the 
dependent variable are the declining mill-level inefficiency scores taken from 
Appendices 3 and 4. The first column of Table 3 reports the results for the aggregate 
of all mills in our sample. Subsequent columns show the results for select categories 
of mills. 
" An initial estimation mth a Cobb-Douglas specification did show increasing returns to scale. Results 
available from the author. 
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Our measure of capital improvement is the ratio of net capital to original 
capital. This ratio increases as new capital is added to the stock, and as original 
capital is removed from service. The positive sign on the capital ratio in the first 
column of estimates (for the full sample of mills) suggests that the industry's rapid 
introduction of capital improvements has meant that significant start-up costs 
associated with new capital have been important for several mills at a time throughout 
the sample period, and that the elapsed period of our analysis has not been sufficient 
to capture all efficiency gains due to capital improvements. A longer data series and 
an industry that was adopting new technologies, but adopting them less rapidly, 
would be less likely to display this positive effect on inefficiency. 
Improvements in labor and shifts to modern energy sources might both 
improve efficiency (decrease the inefficiency scores). Our measure of improved labor 
is the ratio of engineers to total employees. Our measure of energy is the ratio of 
electricity consumption to coal consumption. Increases in each significantly improve 
efficiency for our full sample of mills. The capital, labor, and energy effects on 
efficiency are robust. 
The signs of the respective coefficients are the same for all mill categories as 
they are for the full sample of mills, and these signs are often significant for mills 
categorized by mill size, fiber preference, bleach technology, or location. 
For this paper, however, we are more interested in the effect of increasing 
pollution levies on the technical efficiency of our mills. We know (from the first stage) 
that higher levies decrease pollution, but will they also cause mills to produce closer 
to the production frontier or farther away? We can see from the first column of results 
that the level of the pollution levy has no consistent effect on efficiency. Increasing 
the levy actually increases technical efficiency for wood-fiber mills and for mills in 
Fujian. The more modern mills in our sample fall in these two categories. Increasing 
the levy does correlate with greater distances from the production frontier for mills 
reliant on non-wood-fiber and for mills in Yunnan. Non-wood-fiber mills are a growing 
segment of the industry. They, and their emissions, have been more difficult for the 
government to control. Mills in Yunnan were slower to experience government 
pollution control policy and this policy has probably not been applied as uniformly, 
especially for the smaller mills in that province. 
If increases in the levy decrease pollution but do not deter efficient operation 
in modern mills, then we can anticipate that economic instruments will be effective 
policy tools as the industry continues to modernize. In fact, the government seems to 
have the same perception. It is experimenting with tradable permits, a more complex 
economic instrument for pollution control." 
Regarding the smaller, non-wood-fiber mills, which are the greatest polluters 
of the rural environment, enforcing pollution control responsibilities has proven to be 
a difficult task. If higher pollution levies correlate with greater distances from the 
production frontier for these mills, then a pollution control standard may be a better 
alternative. The government's recent decision to simply close the smallest and worst 
offenders may be the right strategy. 
17 
The impact of a system of tradable penmts on the mills in this sample is the topic of another chapter of the 
dissertation. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Three major conclusions emerge from our assessment of paper mills during 
the 1982-1994 period of economic reforms. Their policy implications are remarkably 
consistent with the central government's industrial and environmental policy decisions 
since 1994-although in some cases, our evidence argues for even more aggressive 
environmental policy. 
First, China's system of pollution levies decreased environmental emissions, 
and higher levies decreased emissions even more. Economic incentives worked. 
There is evidence, however, that the levies have not been high enough to induce 
even the most modern mills to adopt modern pollution control technologies. 
Therefore, we would hypothesize that higher pollution levies would be more effective 
yet. It is unclear how high the levies would have to be raised to induce technological 
improvements. This depends on the individual pollutants and their abatement costs. 
A nationwide survey in late 1980s on mill level abatement cost suggested that the 
levy should be doubled (NEPA 1996). 
Second, the production function for paper generally demonstrates the 
anticipated positive relationship between conventional paper products and 
environmental emissions. It also demonstrates an unusual negative marginal product 
for labor and it raises the possibility of increasing returns to scale. 
The government responded to widespread evidence of redundant labor in 
1995 and the managers of state-owned mills released one-fifth of their labor force by 
1998. Our production function anticipates that the net effects of this policy change 
will include both increased mill productivity and an improved environment. 
The possibility of increasing returns to scale requires further examination. 
Combined with evidence that some effluents decrease with expanding mill production and 
others have less than unitary output elasticities, IRS would support the government's 
decision in 1996 to close the most environmentally offending small mills. 
Third, the pollution levy has differential effects on the productive efficiency of 
different categories of mills. It increases productive efficiency in the most 
technologically advanced mills, but correlates with greater distances from the 
production frontier for the class of small mills that rely on non-wood fibers. The first 
provides further argument that increasing the levy would induce more adoption of 
modern pollution control technologies by those mills capable of using the technology. 
The pollution levy brings about Pareto improvement in the modern sector due to 
decreased emissions and enhanced efficiency. The second class of mills are 
comparable to the rapidly growing and most environmentally intrusive of private (or 
township and village enterprise) mills that were not in our sample. Either taxing or 
regulating the multitude of these small mills poses an exceptionally difficult 
administrative problem. Evidence from this study supports the government's decision 
to close 4,000 of them. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1. Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
1. Predicted inputs 
WW Wastewater emission in 1,000 m3 
COD Total COD discharge in tonnes 
TSS Total TSS discharge in tonnes 
E Total energy use (standard coal equivalent) in 1,000 tonnes 
ALK Total alkali use in tonnes 
2. Production frontier 
VAL Output evaluated in 1980 prices 
3. Efficiency Analysis 
EFF Inefficiency score 
Independent Variables 
1. Predicted inputs 
FD Dummy variable for Fujian Province 
T time 
P Average output price for each mill 
K Capital input (depreciation + maintenance fee) 
L Labor (number of employees) 
T x R Levy intensity (total levy charged/calculated levy liability) 
WD Wood fiber dummy 
NWD Non-wood fiber dummy 
BD Dummy for bleach process 
2. Production frontier 
t time 
T2 time squared 
K Capital input (depreciation + maintenance fee) 
L Labor (number of employees) 
PE Predicted value of energy 
PALK Predicted value of alkali 
PWW Predicted value of wastewater discharge 
PTSS Predicted value of TSS 
PCOD Predicted value of COD 
WD Wood fiber dummy 
NWD Non-wood fiber dummy 
BD Dumm for bleach process 
3. Efficiency analysis 
t time 
KR Net capital stock/original capital stock 
LR Number of engineers/number of employees 
ER Amount of electricity used/coal (in standard coal) 
T x R Levy intensity (total levy charged/calculated levy liability) 
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Appendix Table 2. Translog production frontier coefficients 
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate Variable Estimate 
In K 1.3931 * ! (In K) 0.0634 "** (In L)*(In E) 0.1958 
(1.8306) (31.9319) (1.6175) 
In L 1.7709 (In L) 0.3128 *** (In L)*(In PALK) -0.5537 *** 
(0.7316) (14.6056) (-3.6898) 
In PE -0.8642 (In PE) -0.6315 *** (In E)*(In PALK) 1.4463 *** 
(-0.2167 (-8.1703) 4.0178) 
In PALK 1.1894 (In PALK -0.6949 *** WD 3.1642 
(0.2715) (-6.0175) (0.4707) 
In PWW 0.2983 *** (In K) * (In L) -0.5079 *** NWD 1.3181 
(4.1070 - -  (-18.6838) (1.0310) In PTSS 43 7 08 (In K) * (In PE) 0.4991 *** BD 2.3839 
(0.3249 (8.0699) (0.4181) 
In PCOD -5.7197 (In K)*(In PALK) -0.4530 *** 
(-0.2620) L(-6.1862) 
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. 
levels, respectively. 
, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 




(L, B, W) 
Mill3 











1992 0.3545 0 1.8741 3.8470 2.2496 3.2486 2.6949 3.3597 4.9978 
1990 2.0034 1.3947 2.6133 4.6727 3.5015 4.8431 3.9566 3.8319 5.3868 
1989 3.4832 2.7305 3.4219 5.5884 4.8874 6.3362 5.2009 4.4989 6.0014 






































1992 4.4624 3.5398 5.5262 4.3415 1.8758 2.1132 2.4230 3.5572 
1990 5.4544 4.6443 6.5089 5.9855 3.1877 3.4248 3.6692 4.5367 
1989 6.4806 5.8066 7.5123 7.4995 4.5522 4.7718 4.9055 5.5652 
1987 7.5409 7.0267 8.5362 8.8834 5.9693 6.1543 6.1318 6.6425 
1986 8.6354 8.3045 9.5807 10.1374 7.4390 7.5722 7.3482 7.7687 
1985 9.7642 9.6402 10.6459 11.2613 8.9614 9.0255 8.5547 8.9437 
r 1982 10.9271 11.0336 11.7316 12.2553 10.5364 10.5143 9.7512 10.1677 
Codes: L = large or capacity over 5,000 tonnes annual capacity; B = bleach; W = wood; 
and NW = non-wood 
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(L, B, W) 
Mill 26 
(B, W) 
1992 3.1427 3.1039 2.2295 3.4573 2.2915 4.5222 2.2326 3.5675 3.1091 
1990 4.2695 4.7167 3.3159 4.3521 3.5110 5.6904 3.3843 4.5691 4.3700 
1989 5.4082 6.1972 4.4581 5.3116 4.7036 6.8374 4.5427 5.6657 5.5855 
1987 6.5590 7.5454 5.6562 6.3360 5.8694 7.9632 5.7078 6.8570 6.7556 
1986 7.7217 8.7613 6.9103 7.4250 7.0083 9.0680 6.8794 8.1433 7.8803 
1985 8.8964 9.8450 8.2202 8.5789 8.1203 10.1516 8.0577 9.5244 8.9597 













Mill 33 Mill 34 
1992 2.0799 1.9378 4.7398 4.8897 2.1094 4.0728 3.3768 5.7077 
1990 3.4161 3.3898 5.7152 5.9939 3.2253 5.0843 4.4509 6.1841 
1989 4.7233 4.7402 6.7738 7.0660 4.3590 6.1672 5.5727 6.8993 
1987 6.0014 5.9890 7.9155 8.1062 5.5105 7.3216 6.7421 7.8536 
1986 7.2504 7.1361 9.1404 9.1145 6.6797 8.5474 7.9591 9.0469 
1985 8.4703 8.1816 10.4485 10.0907 7.8666 9.8447 9.2236 10.4791 
1982 9.6611 9.1255 11.8398 11.0350 9.0713 11.2134 10.5359 12.1503 
Codes: L = large or capacity over 5,000 tonnes annual capacity; B = bleach; W = wood; 
and NW = non-wood 
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